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Introduction 
It is an economic truism that a scar­
city of resources necessitates choice. A 
successful market system allocates re­
sources in an impartial manner, auction­
ing them off to their highest valued uses. 
However, market failures do occur and 
common property resources, such as 
fisheries, are well-known examples. 
Unlimited access to a common property 
fishery negates any incentive to con­
serve the resource, and a classic case of 
overfishing is the usual result. This pa-
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ABSTRACT-A common property re­
source with open access, such as afishery, 
will be used to excess when faced with suf­
ficient demand. This will lead to an exces­
sive amount ofeffort on the part ofthe fish­
ery, resulting in a depletion ofthe stock. This 
paper discusses the development ofa prop­
erty rights regime for the Atlantic calico 
scallop, Argopecten gibbus, fishery of 
Florida. The management solution of the 
Calico Scallop Conservation Association 
(CSCA) provides an example ofthe assign­
ment ofproperty rights to a common prop­
erty resource without resorting to govern­
mental intervention. In this particularfish­
ery, self-regulation limited early harvesting 
which would be uneconomic; there may be 
other fisheries in which self-regulation 
could be economically efficient and biologi­
cally appropriate. While this solution may 
not be applicable to all common property 
resources, for those cases which may be 
similar; the example of the CSCA provides 
valuable information that may be helpful in 
establishing a more efficient use of the re­
source. Some types ofgovernment facilita­
tion may also be useful. 
per examines a shared resource, 
Florida's Atlantic calico scallop, Argo­
pecten gibbus, which appears to have 
been exempt from this overexploitation 
and inefficiency due to a cooperative 
management solution. 
Background 
The Brevard County calico scallop 
fishery, along the eastern coast of 
Florida, was once among the largest 
scallop fisheries in the world. Recorded 
landings exceeded 40 million pounds of 
scallop meat in 1984. At present, the 
fishery is mostly inactive as a result of 
a biological kill caused by the proto­
zoan parasite Marteilia previously un­
known in this part of the Atlantic, and 
the appearance of which is not believed 
to have been associated with harvest­
ing levels or techniques (Moyer et all). 
The Brevard County calico scallop 
fishery was developed in the early 
1980's, although some commercial fish­
ing began as early as 1967. The devel­
opment was triggered by an increase in 
stocks and the refinement of automated 
steam processing equipment (Blake and 
Moyer, 1991). Calico scallops are fairly 
small, generally reaching 40-60 mm 
(1.6-2.4 inches) in shell height 
(SAFMC and GFMC, 1982). Depend­
ing on the time of year, harvesting in­
tensity, and other factors, it requires an 
average of 100-350 calico scallops to 
yield a single pound of scallop meats 
and 8.75 pounds to equal 1 gallon. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, a viable com­
mercial fishery had to await the devel-
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opment ofa highly mechanized method 
of harvesting and processing. Not sur­
prisingly, also, the highly mechanized 
methods developed have produced an 
economic environment in which the ef­
ficient processor is relatively large. As 
a result, the processing of the scallop is 
oligopsonistic in nature, with the 5 firms 
owning and operating some vessels but 
also sometimes contracting with private 
vessels. In 1988, 5 firms were active in 
the Brevard County calico scallop fish­
ery, with 4 firms processing the scal­
lops in Cape Canaveral (Rockwood and 
Pompe2). 
The Brevard County calico scallop 
fishery was unique in the way the prod­
uct was handled. Boats were normally 
only out about 12 hours, including run­
time from the dock. (Shrimp boats, for 
example, may be out 3 weeks or more 
and mayor may not freeze their prod­
uct while at sea.) Calico scallops were 
processed mechanically as soon as they 
arrived in port by one of the four large 
processing plants located in Port Cana­
veral. Indeed, vessels typically were 
given appointment times at the plant to 
ensure that their product would be ex­
peditiously handled when it arrived 
(Rockwood and Pompe2). 
Although calico scallops are found 
in places other than the eastern United 
States, and even there extend as far 
north as North Carolina, the heaviest 
concentrations have been found in off­
shore beds, of up to 20 miles wide, from 
St. Augustine nearly to Fort Pierce. 
Location of the processing plants in 
Port Canaveral was due to geography 
rather than mere happenstance. Calico 
2Rockwood, C. E., and J. Pompe.1988. Economic 
impact of the Brevard County calico scallop fish­
ery. Econ. Consultants, Inc., 2423 Winthrop Rd., 
Tallahassee, FL 32312. Unpubl. rep., 31 p. 
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scallops cannot be landed just any­
where; vessel run-time to and from the 
scallop beds is critical to the economic 
viability of the fishery and to the fresh­
ness of the landed product. 
The oligopsonistic nature of this fish­
ery provided the opportunity for coop­
erative behavior, which was effected 
through formation of a Calico Scallop 
Conservation Association (CSCA)3 in 
1986 (Rockwood and Pompe2). Flor­
ida's calico scallop industry may not fit 
the classic model of a commons fish­
ery, since some biologists do not con­
sider overfishing to be a problem dur­
ing most years since stocks are annual 
(Blake and Moyer, 1991). However, 
early harvesting of scallops before 
maturation, which could stress the fish­
ery and prove uneconomic, was regulated 
by the association. Indeed, the stated pur­
pose of the association was to hire a bi­
ologist to determine harvesting guidelines. 
Members agreed to limit fishing until at 
least 75% of the stock at a particular lo­
cation reached a shell height of at least 
38 mm (Blake and Moyer, 1991). There­
fore, although this fishery may not fit the 
classic overfishing model it is still relevant 
to policy. The enforcement of the self­
regulation will be discussed below. 
Also important, the calico scallop 
fishery is for all intents and purposes 
entirely a commercial fishery. Thus, 
unlike so many fisheries, recreational 
fishermen do not compete in any seri­
ous way either for the calico scallop 
resource directly, or for resources which 
are in any meaningful sense in the same 
food chain. This characteristic, com­
bined with reasonable costs of contract­
ing, facilitated the cooperative solution. 
The Commons Tragedy 
and Alternative Solutions 
The lack of property rights to a com­
mons area leads to social welfare losses 
resulting in what Hardin (1968) de­
scribed as the "tragedy of the com­
mons." This classic article explains how 
a herdsman is compelled to increase his 
herd without limit until the village com­
mons is overgrazed. This action is "ra­
3Mention of trade names or commercial firms or 
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tional" for the individual, since the ad­
ditional benefits for the individual 
herdsman exceed the additional private 
costs. However, the additional cost to 
society is greater than the additional 
benefit, for the eventual result is de­
struction of the commons. Similarly, an 
individual would have no incentive to 
protect scallop resources unilaterally if 
any benefits from conservation were to 
be shared by all members of the "com­
mons," while the lost revenues were 
suffered only by those who conserve. 
As Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 
(1965) have noted, this is more accu­
rately the case where there is open ac­
cess to a natural resource. The fact that 
the resource is common property does 
not dictate a "tragedy." Therefore, it is 
important to differentiate between open 
access (res nullius), where resources can 
be exploited without restrictions, and 
common property (res communes) 
which can have restrictions on use. 
Hanna (1990) discusses the positive 
attributes of community control, con­
tending that overuse of resources is pos­
sible under private ownership as well. 
With open access to a resource, if suffi­
cient demand exists, the resource tends 
to be overused. With a lack of enforce­
able property rights, scarcity rents will 
be dissipated, and firms will tend to 
overuse the resource. The current gen­
eration suffers a loss of welfare as high 
capital costs and inefficiency, in the 
form ofan excess amount of boats, fish­
ermen, and effort, results. In addition, 
as fish populations decline from over­
fishing, benefits to future fishermen and 
consumers may be lost or reduced. 
However, if these rents can be cap­
tured by firms sharing the commons, the 
members have an incentive to come to 
a voluntary agreement that prevents 
overuse. Resource owners recognize 
that the resource has an asset value as 
well as a use value. By conserving the 
resource for future users, owners can 
expect a return on their investment in 
the form of economic profits. To main­
tain a commons without ruination, us­
ers must be able to exclude interlopers 
and regulate member-use of the re­
source at reasonable cost. As discussed 
further in the next section, the CSCA 
has been able to meet both conditions. 
Arguments have been made that the 
solution to the problem of open access 
must be either privatization or govern­
ment intervention (Hardin and Baden, 
1977). However, Berkes et al. (1989) 
offer several examples of controlled use 
of a commons without resorting to one 
of these two possible solutions. Maine 
lobsters, for example, have been main­
tained by traditional fishing rights, en­
forced by the community, using vio­
lence if necessary (Acheson, 1988). The 
Nijukiine Forest on the lower slopes of 
Mount Kenya was successfully operated 
as a communal forest by kinship and 
neighborhood groups until colonial rule 
broke down traditional rules (Castro, 
1991). Aquaculture, which provides 
property rights, has also mitigated the 
commons tragedy in some species such 
as crawfish, mussels, and oysters. 
Privatization, the process of defining 
and enforcing ownership rights for in­
dividual or corporate control, may be a 
possible alternative to help manage 
some resources better. Property rights 
to fishing sites on rivers and streams in 
Scotland and England have been in op­
eration since the 1960's (Anderson, 
1983). Landowners maintain desirable 
fishing spots to rent to sporting groups. 
Although different laws do not usu­
ally allow the same procedure in the 
United States, there are some similar 
developments. In Montana's Yellow­
stone River Valley, for example, some 
spring creeks, flowing entirely on pri­
vate property, are maintained and rented 
by landowners (Anderson, 1983). In 
these cases, where rights can be estab­
lished and enforced, efficient use of the 
streams is encouraged. 
Among the various policies at­
tempted by the government to prevent 
fishery overuse are regulated ineffi­
ciency, tax systems, and quotas. Unfor­
tunately, the fisheries literature is replete 
with the failures of such regulation with 
few encouraging results. As is illus­
trated by the regulatory attempts of the 
Pacific salmon fishery, government in­
tervention is often ineffectual and 
costly. Crutchfield and Pontecorvo 
(1969) estimated that the excessive 
amount of capital and labor used as a 
result of regulated inefficiency led to a 
waste of $50 million each year. In ex­
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amining the regulated Pacific halibut 
industry, Crutchfield (1969) estimated 
that two-thirds of the fishing effort was 
unnecessary. 
In addition, well meant government 
intentions are often negated by special­
interest and rent-seeking behaviors. For 
example, the 1976 Magnuson Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act, 
extended the nation's oceans jurisdic­
tion of from 3 to 200 miles, with the 
goal of controlling overfishing by for­
eign fleets. However, as foreign fishing 
declined, the regional regulatory body 
was pressed to allow increased domes­
tic harvests. As a resu~t, catch quotas 
and trip limits, meant to prevent over­
fishing, were lifted in 1982. With im­
proved technology, such as fish finders, 
and increased demand for fish pushing 
up prices, certain New England fisher­
ies, for a short time, saw an increase in 
catch levels. Since 1983, however, there 
has been a sharp drop in fish caught, 
due to severe overfishing (Ingrassia, 
1991). Estimates quoted in Tregarthen 
(1992) have placed the lost value to so­
ciety of the overfishing of New England 
waters at about $150 million per year. 
The CSCA Solution 
Coase (1960) indicates that agree­
ments are not instituted in many com­
mon-property situations because costs 
would be too high. Fields (1989) sepa­
rates costs into two categories-trans­
actions costs among commons users and 
exclusion costs against outsiders. Trans­
actions costs would result from efforts 
by the members to police free-riders 
within the cooperative who may shirk 
responsibilities. Costs of exclusion 
would be those incurred to maintain the 
commons boundaries from outsiders. 
Unless some occurrence would lead to 
increased demand for the product or to 
decreased costs of operation, a solution 
to the inefficiency in the fishery would 
not be expected without government 
intervention. 
The impetus behind the movement 
toward the scallop cooperative was the 
increase in stocks and technological 
changes discussed earlier, especially 
those that led to an oligopsonistic struc­
ture in scallop processing, and hence to 
relatively much lower costs of enforc­
ing cooperative behavior. In this envi­
ronment, successful formation of the 
CSCA was possible. 
Economies of scale limited new pro­
cessor entrants to the fishery, thus hold­
ing down exclusion costs. Since there 
is no competition from recreational fish­
ermen for the scallop, this exclusion 
cost is further reduced. Additionally, the 
nonmigratory nature of scallops makes 
property rights still more attainable for 
the cooperative. With the concentration 
of the scallops within a relatively small 
area, cooperation by a small number of 
members is further enhanced. Since all 
scallops caught were delivered to the 
CSCA processors, desired rules on har­
vesting could be maintained by the 
CSCA. 
The specific mechanism was that any 
firm in the fishery had the right to in­
spect the catch of any vessel, whether 
being landed at its processing plant or 
the plant of a rival firm. It was agreed 
that if a random sample of 6 gallons of 
shucked scallop meats averaged less 
than 38 mm in shell size, the product, 
by common agreement, was to be dis­
carded-thrown overboard. Thus, al­
though the scallop industry was not 
overfished in the classic sense, this joint 
conservation and economic measure 
represents the cooperative solution. 
In the first couple of weeks of the 
cooperative agreement, rumors of the 
landing of undersized product were fre­
quent. But, the checking mechanism 
ended the rumors quickly. In the end, 
one boat captain turned himself in, and 
one processor turned in one of his boat 
captains. In each case the product was 
discarded. After those instances, the 
agreement seemed to work well, and the 
natural conflict among boat captains and 
between boat captains and processors was 
reduced at least to a tolerable level. 
A part of the reason why the agree­
ment worked so well is no doubt due to 
the fact that the CSCA did not estab­
lish the 38 mm shell size constraint. 
That was developed independently by 
a university biologist whose research 
was underwritten largely by the indus­
try, but who was able to be persuasive 
about the rationale for the size restric­
tion. Thus, the a&reements of the CSCA 
were limited to these harvesting guide­
lines and not to other economic deci­
sions such as a division of market share. 
With the small number of CSCA 
members (5), costs of policing were 
kept low. More members in the agree­
ment would increase the policing costs, 
so transactions costs would be expected 
to be directly related to the number of 
firms. Liebcap and Wiggins (1984) 
found that if the number of firms was 
less than five, private agreements could 
be completed successfully between 
firms sharing a common pool of oil. 
State enforcement was necessary when 
the number of firms rose to about 10-12. 
Johnson and Libecap (1982) show 
that the greater the heterogeneity among 
firms, the higher the contracting and 
transaction costs will be. Although lev­
els of operation and output vary among 
the CSCA members, managerial skills 
and processing equipment are similar 
for each member, and can be transferred 
to new members, along with quota 
rights. Johnson and Libecap (1982) also 
argue that taxes or quotas set by the 
government are inefficient solutions, as 
better fishermen will lose economic 
rents that they could gamer through 
greater fishing skills. 
EnvirQnmental uncertainties such as 
disease and migration of scallops chal­
lenge management of the fishery. This 
complicates determination of harvest­
ing guidelines. Although this uncer­
tainty will increase the costs of control 
to the cooperative, it can still be argued 
that the CSCA solution was a more de­
sirable result than could be expected 
from open access and was as good as 
or better than could be expected from 
governmental regulation. 
Enabling Legislation 
Although the conditions under which 
a cooperative solution can arise are very 
restrictive, the conditions could be en­
hanced greatly by enabling legislation. 
The enabling legislation would allow 
the formation of cooperatives and pro­
vide that decisions of the duly elected 
cooperative member firms would be 
binding on all. This would allow for a 
cooperative solution without the need 
for the very unusual circumstances 
which fostered the CSCA. 
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Historically, it has been difficult to 
limit access to ocean fisheries, as some 
voluntary agreements have been seen to 
be violations of antitrust policy. Agree­
ments by U.S. fishermen unions from 
the 1930's to the 1950's were dismantled 
by the Federal government as violations 
of the Sherman Act. Numerous legal 
cases brought by the canneries and ex­
cluded fishermen challenged the legal­
ity of these arrangements (Libecap, 
1989). 
Vertical integration, when a company 
operates in more than one stage of the 
production process, could be subject to 
antitrust legislation. Cooperatives have 
been given some exemptions in this 
area. Section 6 of the Clayton Act 
(1914) and the Capper-Volstead Act 
(1922) partially exempted agricultural 
cooperatives from antitrust restrictions. 
The Fisheries Cooperative Marketing 
Act (1934) gave a similar exemption to 
fishermens' organizations (Benson and 
Greenhut, 1986). 
What would be the logical decisions 
that might be legislatively mandated as 
enforceable? Government guidelines 
most readily acceptable to affected par­
ties would be ones that increase the 
value of the catch. Limits to the num­
ber of members, cooperative member­
ship fees, resource opening and closing 
dates, gear restrictions, and harvest lim­
its (quantity and/or size) seem the most 
obvious choices. Gear restrictions that 
allow small scallops to escape would be 
efficient, although if restrictions simply 
limit competition, this may reduce tech­
nical efficiency and thus be undesirable. 
If a fishery is already established, 
greater consideration may have to be 
given to guidelines, since established 
fishermen would prefer the status quo 
to permitting additional competition. 
Certain attributes of the calico scal­
lop fishery help to identify fisheries or 
other industries with similar manage­
ment problems that would be suitable 
for such a cooperative approach. As 
mentioned, the small number of partici­
pating firms, the fact that they were in 
close proximity to each other, and the 
fact that there were no recreational fish­
ermen all seem important. The fact that 
the life cycle of calico scallops is very 
short is also significant. One can hardly 
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imagine prudent management of whal­
ing by the member firms. As whales live 
for decades, the time horizon would be 
too long. No doubt other critical at­
tributes of a successful candidate for 
such a management regime will occur 
to others. 
Conclusion 
A common property resource with 
open access, such as a fishery, will be 
used to excess when faced with suffi­
cient demand. This will lead to an ex­
cessive amount of effort on the part of 
the fishery, dissipating scarcity rents, 
and resulting in depletion of the stock. 
The possibility of capturing these lost 
rents creates an incentive for fishermen 
to contract among themselves. Since 
establishing property rights is costly, the 
rewards for the contractors must out­
weigh costs. 
This paper has considered the forma­
tion and enforcement of property rights 
which led to a gain in efficiency. The 
CSCA provides an example of how 
property rights can be assigned to a 
common property resource without re­
sorting to governmental intervention. 
Although the scallop industry was not 
overfished in the classic sense, coopera­
tive self-regulation of scallop harvest­
ing represented an improvement over 
the common pool losses that would ex­
ist without controls. 
The impetus behind the transforma­
tion was technological change. By in­
ternalizing the cost of regulation, re­
sources could be allocated more effi­
ciently, with increased productivity of 
the grounds and lowered costs due to 
economies of scale. Distribution of the 
gains may be controversial, requiring 
compensation to parties negatively af­
fected. If the fishery had been well es­
tablished before the CSCA, it would 
have been more difficult to achieve co­
operation, as established fishermen 
would have preferred the status quo. 
The inflexibility and ineffectiveness 
of much government policy makes the 
cooperative solution a desirable alter­
native. Earlier, a few examples of the 
failure ofgovernment regulation of fish­
eries were considered. Given the cur­
rent deregulatory mood among policy 
makers (i.e., banking, airlines, trucking, 
etc.), which has recognized the benefits 
of the market incentive approach, it would 
be practical to consider the applicability 
of the cooperative as an alternative ap­
proach to regulation. By allowing groups 
to be self-regulating, in effect Adam 
Smith's self-interested individual prin­
ciple can lead to gains for society. 
The calico scallop fishery is a com­
mon property that lent itself to a coop­
erative solution, as discussed above. If 
costs of policing members and exclud­
ing nonmembers can be kept low, the 
motivation to act in a productive and 
collective manner can exist for similar 
fisheries. The government may play a 
role in reducing the costs of establish­
ing rights in those fisheries that exhibit 
elements similar to the CSCA. For ex­
ample, government officials may set the 
maximum sustainable yield allowed or 
perhaps limit the number of members. 
The rights to the fishery could be auc­
tioned off to the highest bidders, 
whether they may be the local commu­
nity or other interested parties, creating 
revenues that could be utilized for im­
provement of the resource. The govern­
ment could be used in a limited man­
ner, with the sole purpose of internaliz­
ing the costs of regulation. Clearly, it 
may not be feasible to provide owner­
ship rights for all fisheries, especially 
those involving migratory patterns over 
large areas. 
The economic benefits from an effi­
ciently run operation can be consider­
able. With the prospect of growing re­
source scarcity in fisheries and substan­
tial social welfare gains to be realized 
from proper management, the viability 
of efficient cooperatives should be fur­
ther explored. 
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